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“We are proud that we are the great arctic empire!”  
                                        --- Artur Chilingarov
1 
                                                           
1 Artur Chilingarov, Russian Polar Explorer, Member of the 
Duma and Special Representative of the Russian President for 
the International Polar Year, ITAR TASS Press Conference, the 
8th of September 2007, at the return from the flag planting 
expedition at the North Pole. 
Climate  change  will  cause  major  physical, 
ecological,  economic,  social,  and  geopolitical 
adjustment.  The  Arctic  more  specifically,  is 
undergoing  some  of  the  most  rapid  and  drastic 
climate change on earth. This is leading to a new 
interest in the region, not only by the Arctic states, 
but also by other major powers. 
Even  though  it  was  the  shortest  route  for 
intercontinental  ballistic  missiles  and  strategic 
bombers,  and  the  main  base  of  the  soviet 
submarine fleet during the Cold War, until recently, 
the Arctic remained a geopolitical backwater. The 
relative lack of interest in the Arctic did not prevent 
conflicts of interest, but these did not lead to major 
tensions.  
This article will firstly look into the effects of Arctic 
melting.  It  will  then  analyse  the  geopolitical 
consequences for Russia. Thirdly, it will focus on 
the legal framework  regulating  the sovereignty  of 
the seabed and freedom of navigation with regard 
to  the  Arctic.  Fourthly,  it  will  look  into  Russia’s 
submission to the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental  Shelf  (CLCS).  It  will  then  identify 
overlapping claims and potential conflicts between 
the coastal states. After exploring the arctic policies 
of the other littoral states, it will finally look into 
means of preventing these potential conflicts from 
arising. 
Climate  change  will  cause  major 
physical,  ecological,  economic,  social, 
and  geopolitical  adjustments.  Arctic 
melting is providing new opportunities, 
not  only  to  the  five  littoral  states,  but 
also  to  other  major  powers.  However, 
Russia  stands  to  gain  most.  Not  only 
can it claim a major part of the Arctic, 
thus  acquiring  additional  sovereign 
rights  for  the  purpose  of  exploiting 
natural resources, but for the first time 
it  will  have  unhindered  access  to  the 
open  seas  and  be  in  the  position  of 
controlling  important  sea  routes.  If 
exploitation of the Arctic and the use of 
new  sea-lanes  can  be  developed  in  a 
controlled manner, the Arctic need not 
become  a  region  of  confrontation. 
However, a long-term risk continues to 
exist of Arctic melting provoking a race 
for the North Pole area. 
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Effects of Arctic Melting 
For  the  first  time  in  modern  history,  wide  scale 
access to natural resources in the Arctic, especially 
extraction  of  hydrocarbons  and  minerals,  could 
become  an  economically  viable  activity.2 
Furthermore,  the  melting  of  large  parts  of  the 
icecap  could  open  up  ice-free  sea-lanes  in 
summertime north of Russia (Northern Sea Route, 
aka the Northeast Passage), and north of Canada 
(Northwest Passage). The question is no longer if, 
but when these sea routes will be opened up for 
shipping and natural resources in the Arctic Ocean 
will  be  exploitable.  These  perspectives  have 
triggered a new geopolitical interest in this part of 
the world.  
Arctic  melting  could  make  vast  amounts  of 
hydrocarbons technically recoverable with present-
day  technology.  The  U.S.  Geological  Survey 
estimates that the area north of the Arctic Circle 
contains  90  billion  barrels  of  undiscovered  oil, 
1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 billion 
barrels of gas liquids. These are concentrated in 25 
geologically defined areas, amounting to 22 percent 
of  technically  recoverable  hydrocarbons  in  the 
world.3  This  accounts  for  about  13  percent  of 
undiscovered  oil,  30  percent  of  undiscovered 
natural gas, and 20 percent of undiscovered natural 
gas  liquids  in  the  world.  About  84  percent  is 
expected to be located offshore, mostly less than 
500m  deep.  More  than  70  percent  of  the  mean 
undiscovered oil resources are concentrated in five 
geological areas: Arctic Alaska, the Amerasia Basin, 
and the East Greenland Rift Basins, East Barents 
Basins,  and  West  Greenland-East  Canada.  More 
than 70 percent of the undiscovered natural gas is 
estimated  to  be  located  in  three  areas,  the  West 
Siberian Basin, the East Barents Basins, and Arctic 
Alaska.  The  USGS  estimate  puts  more  than  40 
percent of gas deposits in the area Russia can lay 
claim  on.  This  would  enhance  Russia’s  present 
                                                           
2 Deposits of composite manganese nodules have already been 
discovered in the Kara Sea north of Siberia and so have deposits 
of gold, diamonds, tin, nickel, and tungsten. 
 
3 News release by the USGS, 90 billion Barrels of oil and 1,670 
trillion Cubic Feet of Natural Gas assessed in the Arctic, 24 July 
2008, 
<http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article_pf.asp?ID=1980> 
position  as  a  predominating  gas  provider  and 
extend it into the future.4 
The opening up of the Northwest and Northeast 
Passages is going to reform global commerce and 
reshape the geopolitics of the world. The Arctic sea 
routes  will  reduce  the  sailing  distances  by 
substantial  margins.  Using  the  Northeast  Passage 
between  Europe  and  Japan,  would  reduce  the 
distance by approximately 4500 nautical miles for 
those ships that can use the Suez Canal. Likewise, 
for ships that usually would use the Panama Canal, 
the distance between Europe and the west coast of 
the U.S.A. would be reduced by 2000 nautical miles 
using the Northwest Passage. Large ships, that have 
to sail around the Cape of Good Hope and Cape 
Horn, would make even larger savings. If the icecap 
recedes  still  further,  the  possibility  of  direct  sea 
routes  over  the  North  Pole  could  become  a 
possibility, at least part of the year. Furthermore, 
the  opening  up  of  these  sea  routes  would  allow 
avoiding chokepoints in times of crisis, especially in 
the  Middle  East,  off  the  Horn  of  Africa  and  in 
South-East Asia. 
These  perspectives  call  for  the  building  of  ice-
capable ships that are able of navigating without the 
help  of  icebreakers  in  conditions  short  of frozen 
seas.  New  shipbuilding  technologies  allow  for 
operation in ice-covered waters. South Korea and 
Finland are building ice-capable oil and gas tankers. 
Shipbuilders  are  also  developing  similar  LNG 
carriers.  Samsung  Heavy  Industries  is  building 
tankers  with  a  normal  ocean-going  bow  and  a 
reinforced  ice-breaking  stern  to  sail  backwards 
when encountering ice.5 
Geopolitical Consequences for Russia 
Against this background, Arctic melting constitutes 
an opportunity for Russia. It will enhance Russia’s 
                                                           
4 USGS fact sheet, USGS Arctic Oil and Gas Report, Estimates 
of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle, July 
2008, <http://geology.com/usgs/arctic-oil-and-gas-
report.shtml> 
 
5 Rob Huebert, As the ice melts, control ebbs in the Arctic, 
Canada is ill prepared for the challenge to our sovereignty in an 
ice-free Northwest Passage, in, Canadian International Council, 
18 August 2008, 
<http://www.canadianinternationalcouncil.org/aboutus/media/
opeds/astheiceme>  
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position as energy provider and give it free access to 
the world oceans.  
The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation 
until  20206  mentions  the  increasing  rivalry  over 
access  to  energy  resources,  in  particular  in  the 
Middle East, on the continental shelf in the Barents 
Sea and other parts of the Arctic, as well as in the 
Caspian Sea and Central Asia (Par. 11). It does not 
rule out that in the future, competition for energy 
reserves may develop into a military confrontation 
(Par. 12).  
Furthermore,  in  September  2008,  the  Russian 
National  Security  Council  adopted  a  document 
entitled, “The fundamentals of the national policy of the 
Russian  Federation  in  the  Arctic  region until 2020  and 
prospects  beyond.”7  It  emphasises  the  region’s 
importance  for  energy  production  and  maritime 
transport. The Arctic must become Russia’s main 
base for natural resources by 2020 and Russia has 
to  preserve  its  leadership  as  an  Arctic  power. 
Defining the boundaries of its continental shelf by 
2015 is a priority. Therefore, Russia has to develop 
the  communication  and  transport  infrastructure 
into  an  integrated  maritime  transport  route 
connecting  Europe  and  Asia.  It  further  calls  for 
“general-purpose troops stationed in the Arctic region and 
capable  to  guarantee  military  security in  variable military 
and politic situations” and for the FSB (the Russian 
Border Guards are again part of the FSB) to set up 
an  actively  functioning  coast  guard  in  the  Arctic 
zone (Par. 8.b). The document emphasises the need 
to  preserve  the  Arctic  as  a  zone  of  peace  and 
cooperation,  and  underlines  the  role  of  regional 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation (Par. 11).  
Russia  is  a  world  leader  in  natural  gas  and  oil 
exports. Between 2002 and 2008, it was the largest 
gas  producer  and  it  has  the  largest  proven  gas 
reserves.  It  has  the  seventh  largest  proven  oil 
reserves while being the second largest oil producer 
(after  Saudi  Arabia).8  Russia’s  proven  reserves 
combined with the estimates in the Arctic should 
                                                           
6 The Russian version can be found on 
<http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/4047> 
 
7 The Russian version can be found on 
<http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/98.html> 
 
8 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2009. 
guarantee Russia’s place as a major energy supplier 
in  the  coming  decades,  especially  with  regard  to 
Europe.9  Tapping  Russia’s  vast  oil  reserves  will 
require huge investments, in particular in pipelines. 
If  Russia  succeeds,  moreover,  in  modernising  its 
economy,  infrastructure  and  socio-political 
structure,  it  could  once  again  become  a  major 
power.10 
For the first time Russia will have free access to the 
world  oceans.  Russia  has  few  ice-free  ports  that 
provide direct access to the oceans all year round. 
Murmansk and Vladivostok are the most important 
ones, but both are situated far from the economic 
centre of the country. The major ports are on the 
Baltic  or  Black  Sea,  whose  approaches  are 
controlled by NATO.  
Russia is increasingly holding shows of strength in 
the area. In August 2007, it symbolically planted its 
flag  on  the  sea  floor  under  the  North  Pole.  In 
March 2009, Russia announced that troops would 
be specially trained to defend Russian interests in 
the  North  Pole  area.  Artur  Chilingarov,  soviet 
Arctic explorer and confidant of Putin, explained 
that “The pole is ours and we must make our presence there 
visible.  For  Russia  the  pole  area  is  strategic  of  vital 
importance.”  
The Law of the Sea and the Arctic 
Although there is no specific treaty regime for the 
Arctic,  an  extensive  international  legal  framework 
can  be  applied  to  the  region.  The  United  Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides 
the  most  comprehensive  framework  for  dealing 
with the problems arising from renewed interest in 
                                                           
9 However, great care should be taken when predicting 
hydrocarbon reserves in general and Russia’s future position as a 
leader in gas and oil export in particular. The estimates are very 
rough due to the difficulties to survey the Arctic and because 
surveys have been carried out in only a small part of the whole 
region. Furthermore, the exploitation of shale gas in North 
America and the lack of investment in infrastructure have caused 
Russia to lose its position as most important gas producer to the 
U.S. in 2009. Russia will probably not be able to claim this 
position back before 2015 (Anatoly Medetsky, U.S. Dethroning 
Russia as Gas King, in, The Moscow Times, 13 January 2010).  
 
10 For a detailed discussion on modernization in Russia, see 
Patrick Nopens, Russia as an aspiring Power Centre and the 
Elusiveness of Modernity, to be published in the next issue of 
Studia Diplomatica, Vol LXIII, Number 1. 
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the  Arctic.11  It  offers  an  instrument  to  settle 
boundary  disputes  and  to  submit  claims  for 
additional  sovereign  rights  for  the  purpose  of 
exploiting  natural  resources.  Furthermore, 
UNCLOS defines the status of seaways being in the 
sovereign  possession  of  states  or  international 
waterways open to unrestricted navigation.   
Figure 1: UNCLOS zones 
© historicair, wikimedia Commons 
Disputes  around  Arctic  claims  revolve  mainly 
around the extent of the continental shelf of the 
coastal states. Their claims can overlap and form 
the basis for conflict. According to UNCLOS,
12 
“the  continental  shelf  of  a  coastal  state  comprises  the 
seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend 
beyond  its  territorial  sea  throughout  the  natural 
prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the 
                                                           
11 The five coastal states bordering the Arctic Ocean met in 
Ilulissat on 28-29 May 2008. With regard to UNCLOS, they 
agreed that “This framework provides a solid foundation for 
responsible management by the five coastal States and other 
users of this Ocean through national implementation and 
application of relevant provisions. We therefore see no need to 
develop a new comprehensive international legal regime to 
govern the Arctic Ocean. We will keep abreast of the 
developments in the Arctic Ocean and continue to implement 
appropriate measures.” 
 
12 UNCLOS, Art 76, Par 1 and 3.  
continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles 
from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial 
sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental 
margin does not extend up to that distance. […] The 
continental margin comprises the submerged prolongation 
of the land mass of the coastal State, and consists of the 
seabed and subsoil of the shelf, the slope and the rise. 
It does not include the deep ocean floor with its oceanic 
ridges or the subsoil thereof.” 
Coastal  states  have  the  possibility  to  submit 
information on the limits of the continental shelf 
beyond 200 nautical miles to the CLCS to gain the 
rights to exploit their shelf beyond the limit of their 
EEZ. “The limits of the shelf established by a coastal State 
on  the  basis  of  these  recommendations  shall  be  final  and 
binding.”
13 
A second area of dispute results from the different 
interpretations of the conditions of passage of ships 
in  some  narrow  Arctic  waters,  especially  in  the 
Northwest Passage. Canada is prepared to provide 
innocent passage rights. However, most sea powers 
insist on right of transit.
14 
Russia’s Submission to the UNCLOS 
On the 20th of December 2001, Russia delivered its 
submission on the limits of its continental shelf to 
the United Nations. Russia claims more than one 
million km² of Arctic waters (Figure 2 shows the 
boundaries of Russia’s Economic Zone in red and 
its interpretation of the extension of the continental 
shelf shaded in red). Central to the submission is 
the  contention  that  the  Alpha-Mendeleev  and 
Lomonosov  Ridges  are  prolongations  of  the 
Eurasian landmass and thus constitute parts of the 
Russian continental shelf. 
Canada and Denmark stated that they were not in a 
position  to  form  an  opinion  on  the  Russian 
submission, but that this did not imply agreement 
or acquiescence. Furthermore, any recommendation 
by the Commission should be considered without 
prejudice to the delimitation of the continental shelf 
between  their  country  and  Russia.  Norway 
consented to an examination by the Commission of 
                                                           
13 Ibid., Par 8. 
 
14 Innocent passage obliges submarines to surface and does not 
allow aircraft to fly over these waters without consent of the 
littoral state (UNCLOS Part II, Sec 3).  
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Figure 2 : Russia’s Submission to UNCLOS © United Nations 
Russia’s submission. It drew, however, attention “to 
the ongoing unresolved delimitation issue with the 
Russian Federation with regard to the continental 
shelf in the Barents Sea.” This has to be considered 
a  maritime  dispute  and  the  actions  of  the 
Commission should not prejudice matters relating 
to the delimitation of the continental shelf between 
Russia  and  Norway.  Although  not  party  to  the 
Convention, the U.S. concentrated on a scientific 
response  contending  that neither the  Lomonosov 
Ridge  nor  the  Alpha-Mendeleev  ridges  are  the 
continuation  of  the  Eurasian  landmass  but  are 
freestanding formations.    
After considering Russia’s submission in 2002, the 
Commission concluded that the data submitted at 
that stage were insufficient for the classification of 
the Arctic floor sections indicated in it as a Russian 
continental shelf, this making it necessary to submit 
an additional substantiation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Areas of Overlap or Potential Conflict 
There are several areas subject to or with a potential 
for  dispute  in  the  Arctic.  Both  Canada  and 
Denmark  claim  Hans  Island  between  Ellesmere 
Island  and  Greenland.  There  are  unresolved 
delimitation issues between the United States and 
Canada in the Beaufort Sea. Norway, Denmark and 
Iceland have conflicting claims to the continental 
shelf  of  the  Southern  Banana  Hole  between 
Norway, Jan Mayen Land, Iceland and the Faroe 
Islands.  
However,  the  conflicting claims  with  the  greatest 
potential for conflict all involve Russia. Russia and 
Norway have overlapping claims in the Loop Hole 
of  the  Barents  Sea.  This  area,  outside  both 
Norway’s and Russia’s EEZ is about 155.000 km² 
and  is  rich  in  resources.
15  A  second  point  of 
contention  is  the  exploitation  of  the  continental 
shelf of Svalbard. The Treaty concerning the Archipelago 
of Spitsbergen of the 9th of February 1920
16attributed 
sovereignty  to  Norway  but  provided  the  Treaty 
partners with equal rights to the exploitation of its 
resources.  Norway  contends  that  the  Treaty  only 
pertains  to  the  land  and  the  territorial  seas  of 
Svalbard  and  that  the  EEZ  and  the  continental 
shelf are not included. Russia, but also other parties 
to the Treaty, considers the Treaty to cover all areas 
linked to Svalbard. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
15 Russia bases its claim on a sector line linking the furthermost 
western point of the Russian coastline with the North Pole, 
while Norway argues for a median line. The Russian approach is 
based on the military strategic importance of the region. 
 
16 The Treaty recognizes Norwegian sovereignty over the 
archipelago but  “nationals of all the High Contracting Parties 
have equal liberty of access and entry for any reason or object 
[…]; subject to the observance of local laws and regulations, they 
may carry on there without impediment all maritime, industrial, 
mining and commercial operations on a footing of absolute 
equality.”  
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The most complicated issue is caused by Russian, 
Canadian  and  Danish  claims  based  on  the 
prolongation  of  their  continental  shelves.  The 
submission delivered by Russia contains a claim for 
a large part of the Arctic based on the assumption 
that the Lomonosov and Alpha-Mendeleev Ridges 
are prolongations of the Eurasian landmass and as 
such  belong  to  the  Russian  continental  shelf. 
Although they have not yet entered a submission, 
Canada and Denmark, for Greenland, assume that 
the  Lomonosov  Ridge  is  a  prolongation  of 
respectively  Ellesmere  Island  and  Northern 
Greenland.  The  issue  cannot  be  addressed 
comprehensively  before  2014,  by  which  time  the 
three claims have to be presented to the CLCS. 
Another area of potential conflict is the status of 
the  Northwest  Passage.  Canada  considers  the 
Northwest Passage as internal waters, while many 
countries maintain it consists of international straits 
allowing   free transit passage.
17 
Figure 3: The Northwest Passage 
© NASA 
Policy of the Other Littoral States 
The U.S. signed the 1982 Convention on the Law of the 
Sea but did not ratify it. Unless it does ratify the 
Convention, the U.S. cannot deliver submissions to 
the  CLCS  nor  take  part  in  the  discussions  on 
submissions  by  other  countries.  On  the  9th  of 
January 2009, the U.S. announced its “Arctic Region 
Policy.”  It  underlines  the  need  for  international 
cooperation in the region although it is prepared to 
act  independently.  It  supports  ratification  of  the 
UNCLOS  in  order  “to  protect  and  advance  U.S. 
interests, including with respect to the Arctic.” However, 
strong opposition continues to exist, especially in 
republican circles, traditionally against international 
regimes, curtailing American freedom of action.  
                                                           
17 E.g., in 1962, the American SS Manhattan was the first 
commercial ship to transit through the Northwest Passage; its 
voyage prompted diplomatic tensions with Canada. In 1985, the 
U.S. sent the Coastguard icebreaker Coastal Sea through the 
Northwest Passage without seeking permission from Canada. 
Furthermore, U.S. submarines are suspected of regularly 
transiting submerged through the Passage. 
On the 27th of November 2006, Norway made a 
submission to the CLCS to extend its claim beyond 
its  EEZ  in  the  Loop  Hole,  the  Western  Nansen 
Basin and the Banana Hole.
18 In December 2006, 
“The  Norwegian  Government’s  High  North  Strategy” 
(Regjeringensnordområdestrategi)
19  was  released.  In 
March  2009  a  follow-up  was  published,  entitled 
“New  building  blocks  in  the  North”  (Nye 
byggesteinerinord).
20 The overall goal remains creating 
sustainable  growth  and  development  in  the  High 
North.  Norway  fully  supports  multilateral 
cooperation  in  the  region.  It  emphasizes  that 
international  law,  and  UNCLOS  in  particular, 
provides all necessary rules to solve outstanding and 
future issues. Norway plays down any notion of an 
Arctic race, economically or military. Norway seems 
to  be,  however,  somewhat  under  pressure  to 
finalize an agreement on competing claims, as it is 
expected  to  run  out  of  existing  hydrocarbon 
reserves before Russia. 
So far, Denmark has only made a submission for 
the area north of the Faroe Islands. It intends to 
submit  separate  information  on  maritime  areas 
south of the Faroe Islands as well as areas north, 
northeast, and south of Greenland. In May 2008, 
Denmark released a document entitled “Arctic in an 
upheaval.  A  draft  strategy  for  activities  in  the  Arctic” 
(Arktisi  en  brydningstid.  Forslagtilstrategi  for 
aktiviteteridetarktiskeområde).
21 In a separate paper 
on  “Danish  Strategy  in  the  Arctic”  (Dansk  strategii 
Arktis),  Denmark  acknowledges  the  possibility  of 
international  crises  in  case  the  consequences  of 
Arctic melting are not managed well.
22 It stresses 
cooperation and identifies preventing the outbreak 
of an arms race and armed conflict as essential.  
                                                           
18<http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_news/submissions_files/
nor06/nor_exec_sum.pdf> 
 
19<http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/strategien.
pdf > 
 
20<http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Nordomr
%C3%A5dene/byggesteiner_nord090323_2.pdf> 
 
21<http://www.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/962AFDC2-30CE-412D-
B7C7-070241C7D9D8/0/ARKTISK_STRATEGI.pdf> 
 
22 The command structure of the Danish armed forces is being 
adapted. In the near future Denmark is replacing its Greenland 
Command and Faroe Island Command by a new Arctic 
Command.  
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Denmark has until 2014 to enter its submission to 
the CLCS. 
Canada published its vision on development in the 
North in July 2009 in a document entitled “Canada's 
Northern  Strategy:  Our  North,  Our  Heritage,  Our 
Future”. 
23 In it, Canada stresses that “its Government 
is firmly exercising sovereignty over Canada’s Arctic lands 
and waters – sovereignty longstanding, well-established, and 
based on historic title, international law and the occupation of  
                                                           
23 <http://www.northernstrategy.ca/cns/cns.pdf> 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the  region  by  Inuit  and  other  Aboriginal  peoples  for 
thousands  of  years.”  Canada  has  time  until  2013  to 
enter  its  submission  to  the  CLCS.  Canada  is 
building a new military base in Resolute Bay in the 
Northwest  Passage  to  house  the  Canadian  forces 
winter fighting school. It is setting up a new Arctic-
trained  airborne  battalion.  It  also  plans  to 
modernize  dock  facilities  and  an  airstrip  in 
Nanisivik on Baffin Island and to install underwater 
Figure 1: Submitted and Potential Claims (adapted from www.durham.ac.uk/ibru)  
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sensors. Finally, Canada is considering building six 
to eight navy patrol ships for service in the arctic.
24 
The  EU  is  involved  in  the  region  through  its 
Northern  Dimension.
25  In  order  to  provide  the 
basis  for  more  reflection,  the  EU  Commission 
issued  a  communication  to  the  European 
Parliament  on  the  subject,  entitled  “The  European 
Union and the Arctic.”
26 Although the EU is a relative 
newcomer to the Arctic, it certainly has a legitimate 
role  to  play.  It  has  a  major  stake  in  the  Arctic: 
Denmark has territories in the region, and so do 
Norway  and  Iceland,  who  both  are  part  of  the 
European  Economic  Area.  Furthermore,  the  EU 
has strategic partnerships with the U.S., Canada and 
the  Russian  Federation.  Importantly,  the  EU 
member states are dependent for nearly all of their 
energy imports  and  “their  oil majors  have  an  edge  in 
technologies for sustainable exploitation of resources in polar 
conditions that should be maintained.” The EU has the 
largest  merchant  fleet in the  world,  which  would 
benefit substantially from new maritime passages to 
and  from  Europe.  The  document  therefore 
supports  protecting  the  Arctic  environment, 
promoting the sustainable exploitation of resources, 
and upholding “the further development of a cooperative 
Arctic  governance  system  based  on  the  UNCLOS  which 
would  ensure  [i.a.]  security  and  stability.”
27  The 
European Commission identified three main policy 
objectives. These address all aspects of the Arctic 
agenda  except  defence.  The  first,  protecting  and 
preserving the Arctic in unison with its population, consists 
of  environment  and  climate  change,  support  for 
indigenous  peoples  and  the  local  population,  and 
research, monitoring and assessments. The second, 
promoting  sustainable  use  of  resources,  addresses 
hydrocarbons,  fisheries,  transport  and  tourism. 
                                                           
24 Canada to build first Arctic deep water port; military base, in, 
Defence Talk, 13 August 2007. 
<http://www.defencetalk.com/canada-to-build-first-arctic-
deep-water-port-military-base-13020> 
 
25 The Northern Dimension policy of the EU was elaborated in 
1999 with the participation of Norway, Iceland, EU Member 
States and the Russian Federation. Geographically it focuses 
increasingly on northwest Russia, Kaliningrad, the Baltic and the 
Barents Seas, the Arctic and Sub-Arctic areas. The main 
objectives of the policy are to provide a common framework for 
the promotion of dialogue and concrete cooperation, strengthen 
stability and well-being, intensify economic cooperation, and 
promote economic integration, competitiveness and sustainable 
development in Northern Europe 
<http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/north_dim/index_en.h
tm.> 
 
26<http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/arctic_region/index_
en.htm> 
 
27 The EU is building an icebreaker, the Aurora Borealis, for 
general polar scientific research and deep-sea drilling. 
Finally,  the  third  objective  concerns  contributing  to 
enhanced  Arctic  multilateral  governance.  Moreover, 
contrary to the other institutions in the region, the 
EU has large funds and legislative powers, which 
can give it substantial influence. However, the EU 
does not provide a strategy for hard defence of its 
interests in the  Arctic,  ignoring  any  possibility  of 
future conflict in the region and preferring to leave 
defence to NATO and individual states. As such, its 
approach is incomplete and this could undermine 
its influence in the future. 
NATO  is  also  involved  in  the  Arctic,  if  only 
because four of the five littoral states are members 
of  the  Alliance.  Norway  explicitly  states  that  the 
High North is no exception to NATO’s principle 
that all parts of NATO territory enjoy equal levels 
of security. NATO, however, has to tread carefully 
to avoid tensions with Russia. In addition, work is 
under way to include an appropriate reference to 
the Arctic in NATO's New Strategic Concept. The 
“NATO Seminar on the High North” in January 2009, 
discussed  the  possibility  of  establishing  a  "North 
Atlantic Dialogue" within NATO to discuss a range 
of  relevant  topics  such  as  maritime  surveillance, 
climate issues, territorial issues, etc.28 
Although  not  littoral  states,  as  Arctic  melting 
progresses, countries like China, Japan and South 
Korea will also take more interest in the region. 
Avoiding Conflict in the Arctic 
Ingredients for conflict are undoubtedly present in 
the Arctic. Territorial claims and access to resources 
are  typical  causes  of  conflict.  Dwindling 
hydrocarbon  resources  makes  securing  access  to 
new  energy  sources  all  the  more  important.  In 
addition, states seek to control territory to prevent 
others  from  gaining  access  to  its  resources. 
However, all littoral states have not yet introduced 
their  submissions  so  that  the  extent  of  possible 
overlapping  claims  and  the  subsequent 
recommendations by the CLCS are not clear yet. 
For the time being, economic activity is developing 
slowly and is taking place in areas where there are 
no overlapping claims. Moreover, the perspectives 
for  the  energy  industry  are  long-term.  The 
increasing military focus on the area has not turned 
into a regional arms race but rather reflects a desire 
to  assert  sovereignty  and  signal  interests.  The 
question is what will happen when further Arctic 
melting, technological progress and the need to tap 
                                                           
28 The NATO Seminar on Security Prospects in the High North 
took place in Reykjavik on the 28th and 29th of January 2009 to 
address how emerging challenges such as global warming affect 
the Arctic region.  
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into  new  resources  will  focus  on  areas  where 
overlapping claims  do  exist.  In  the  meantime,  all 
littoral  states  are  taking  some  measures  to  boost 
their military capabilities but there are no signs of 
militarization of the region. 
On  the  other  hand,  so  far  at  least,  all  involved 
parties seem to be prepared to rely on the dispute 
resolution mechanisms provided by UNCLOS. This 
includes the present U.S. administration that stated 
it wants to push ratification of UNCLOS through 
Congress. Furthermore, the Arctic is governed by a 
series  of  multilateral  organisations.  The  Arctic  is 
one of the regions where Russia is best integrated in 
international cooperation, with good prospects for 
further development.  
One of the world’s most innovative and successful 
examples  of  regional  cooperation  is  the  Barents 
Cooperation.
29  It  has  played  an  important  role  in 
building  trust  and  mutual  understanding  through 
practical transborder cooperation.  
The key forum for cooperation, the Arctic Council,
30 
has seen its role evolve substantially in recent years. 
However, the U.S., although insisting that the work 
within the Arctic Council is positive, argues that the 
Council  should  sustain  its  current  and  limited 
mandate. The Council takes a pragmatic approach, 
and focuses on issues such as the environment and 
the  development  of  common  standards  for 
shipping  and  other  areas;  it  is  based  on  a  high 
degree of common understanding of the challenges 
and opportunities in the region, and Russia plays a 
constructive role.  However, the  Arctic  Council is 
not mandated for security matters. 
If exploitation of the Arctic and the use of new sea-
lanes can be developed in a controlled manner, the 
Arctic need not become a region of confrontation. 
However,  a  long-term  risk  continues  to  exist  of 
Arctic melting provoking a race for the North Pole 
area. It cannot be excluded that the struggle for raw 
materials and northern sea-lanes could be waged by 
military means. Indeed, both Russia and Denmark 
mention  this  possibility  explicitly,  and  within  the 
                                                           
29 The Barents Cooperation was established in 1993. It includes 
the northern administrative units of Finland, Norway, Russia and 
Sweden. 
 
30 The Arctic Council was established in 1996 to promote 
cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic 
States, with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous 
communities. Member states are Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the U.S. Observers are 
China, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, 
South Korea and the UK.   
U.S.  establishment  scepticism  continues  to  exist 
with regard to UNCLOS, precisely because, from 
the  viewpoint  of  the  major  maritime  power,  it 
curtails  the  freedom  of  the  high  seas.  Therefore, 
firm support for a multilateral approach is essential. 
However,  this  implies  careful  monitoring  of 
developments  in  the  region  and  preparedness  to 
back  up  legitimate  sovereignty  issues  of  member 
states by the EU. 
Arctic melting is providing new opportunities, not 
only  to  the  five  littoral  states,  but  also  to  other 
major  powers.  However,  Russia  stands  to  gain 
most.  Not  only  can  it  claim a  major part  of  the 
Arctic, thus acquiring additional sovereign rights for 
the purpose of exploiting natural resources, but for 
the first time it will have unhindered access to the 
open  seas  and  be  in  the  position  of  controlling 
important sea routes. 
 
Brigadier  General  (Ret.)  Patrick  Nopens 
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